Freewill

Oct 08, 2008 - 00:27 AM PST

Freewill. What exactly is it? Some say that it is the ability to choose A or B independently of anything else in any situation. Others say that the concept of freewill is irrelevant because (the Wester omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent) G!D predetermines everything. Yet, in the purest sense, freewill is the ability to make a choice and take responsibility for that choice because "he could have done otherwise" (WP 333) in that situation and is therefore the "conscious ... author of it." (WP 324)

For simplicity's sake, let us take the example of Burden's Ass. In this paradox, the donkey is starving. He also has two bails of hey in front of him that he can eat. Each bail is equidistant from the donkey and both are exactly the same. In fact, everything surrounding each bail is the same. There is no reason for the donkey to choose one bail over the other. Yet if it doesnt choose, it will starve. Therefore the donkey must choose.

There are three basic reasons that the donkey could choose one bail over the other. In the first case, there is a cause for the choice not dependent on anything beyond reality (i.e. the circumstances that surround the choice). In the second instance, there is no cause for the choice and it comes about ex nihil, from nothing. In the third case, G!D has already determined everything.

In this first case, the set of circumstances that causes the donkey to choose one bail over the other include all of the factors that make the bails unequal. In this sense, unequal describes a modified set up of Burden's Ass in which the events surrounding the decision cause the donkey to favor one bail over the other. Simplistically, these circumstances could be limited to a "handedness" that drives the donkey to step with his right front hoof first, therefore bring him closer to one bail of hay over the other. In a more complex sense, these circumstances could also include a past experience that makes the donkey fear bails of hay on his right side, and therefore fears all hay on his right side. The donkey could think that choosing hay on his right will lead to a bad experience and therefore will choose the hay on his right because it will not lead to a bad experience.

In the first set of circumstances, it could be argued that the handedness choice was made previously by the donkey to step with the right foot first when ever the option presents itself to choose between the left and right foot equally. In this instance, he could have done otherwise, but had no reason to change the hoof he stepped with first and therefore did not bring the choice into his active consciousness. As a result, the choice was not the ultimate in "free" choice because he did not consciously will it. However, in the second set of circumstances, the donkey has to make a conscious, metaphysical choice between the risk of one bail and the safety of the other. If we want to complicate the situation further, the "dangerous bail" could be made more appealing to the donkey's senses and the "safe bail" less appealing. In this situation the choice is even more consciously dependent on the donkey's metaphysical considerations and which ever situation the donkey prefers. Yet one must wonder where this preference comes from.

One could say that this choice comes at random or ex nihil, from nothing. In this situation, the donkey could do otherwise because, if we assume that something can come from nothing and there is no precursor for something, there is an equal probability of anything coming to be. As a result, the donkey is the conscious author of the situation and is therefore free in this situation.

However, if one rejects the random and ex nihil argument, and claims that there must be a cause of the preference that is not ex nihil, one could claim that the preference is based in the donkey's genes, or some other part of the donkey. However, the donkey's genetic coding (or any other part) must still have a cause in this situation if nothing is ex nihil. As this chain is examined, it continues cum nihil ad infinitum, like nothing to infinity, (much like the unmoved mover) until one reaches G!D. This argument that G!D is the cause of everything can hold its weight until the choice leaves the realm of the benign like the bail of hay and moves to something that the Western tradition holds as sin.

Basically, we have now arrived at the problem of evil and issues with determanism. If G!D is omniscient, He knows we will sin. If G!D is omnipotent, He could prevent us from sinning. If G!D is omnibenevolent He would prevent us from sinning so that we would not be punished and would not harm others.

However, G!D is perfect and only does what is best. G!D also created this world. Therefore, this world must be perfect and if G!D were to change this world, that would imply that the world could be more perfect or that G!D would be making the world less perfect. Either way, G!D's actions would not be perfect and therefore not benevolent. As a result, G!D must have provided us with the best possible world and included choice in that world to make it perfect and stem from His omnibenevolence.

This "best possible world argument" holds if one wants to argue that G!D could predispose all people to choose the "good" way or establish all circumstances so that people choose the good way because that predisposition would have to come from G!D. Therefore the choice would not be a true choice stemming from our will, but rather a choice stemming from G!D's influence on us. As a result, we could all do other wise in any situation and must the conscious authors, responsible for our actions because we must be capable of ex nihil choice just as G!D was when he created this world.